relationship between embodiment and technology in making and listening to music; the role of race and gender in judgments of musical value; and the assumptions behind and legitimacy of serious/popular hierarchies (just to name a few). I can't hope to address them all here.
As a musician who composes only in Cubase and "sings" mostly in vocoder, for me the most important questions here revolve around the aesthetics and politics of making contemporary popular electronic music ("electronica," "electro," "synthpop," "house," "techno," "hip-hop"-whatever you choose to call it). Can "faked" music-such as digitally altered performances, machine-generated rhythm or melody lines-be "good"? What are the politics of "faking it"? What assumptions about technology and the body, about the relationship between culture and nature, are operative in musical judgments such as the one discussed earlier-that is, judgments against the proper "musicality" of electronically "faked" music?
The overarching question here, then, is whether musicians can "fake it" and still be considered "good" musicians making "good" music. Behind this question, obviously, are assumptions about the nature of and relationship between conceptions of "real" and "fake," as well as the more blatant assumption that "good" music is somehow not "fake." This latter assumption has roots in both nineteenth-century romanticism and in the race, class, and gender politics of mid-to late twentieth-century Western popular music; indeed, as I will demonstrate in this essay, deconstructing the first set of assumptions helps illustrate the politics at play in this latter set.
To this end, I turn to Sara Kofman-a thinker whose contributions to deconstruction continue to be overlooked-and her analysis of Nietzsche's interrelated conceptions of fetishism, deconstruction, and art. Insofar as the notion of fetishism posits a "normal" or "real" state in contrast to a "perverse" or "fake" one, Kofman's attention to Nietzsche's deconstruction of this term and its relation to art illuminates the possibilities for rethinking the relationship between "real" and "fake" as neither oppositional nor identical. Moreover, in Kofman's Nietzsche, this deconstruction of real/fake binaries operates in the context of/in order to recalibrate systems of musical and aesthetic judgment, such that they no longer privilege values that are politically and materially problematic.
Thus, as Kofman's Nietzsche demonstrates how this deconstructive work is important for musical judgments, late 1970s British post-punk band Essential Logic's piece "Music is a Better Noise" performatively illustrates how this project is important in musical practice and its politics. Presenting a deconstruction of the opposition between "music" and industrial "noise" (either in the over-or underproduced sense), the verbal and musical rhetoric of this piece demonstrates that such hierarchical distinctions are always primarily political (rather than musical).
Picking up on the metaphorics of heavy industry (e.g., the "wheels of steel"), Kodwo Eshun's work on Afro-futurist hip-hop explores the racial and gender politics of this deconstructive interpretation of the relationship between music and industrio-technological "noise." Eshun argues that, in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century West, what's at stake in the myths that structure our judgments about the proper relationship between music and noise, the body and technology, is precisely hegemonic white privilege. In this context, the insistence on separating "real" music from "postwar alienation" is grounded in two interrelated "fetishisms" (in Kofman's sense): the disavowal of the construction of African American identity by white culture as "natural" or "immediate" and the disavowal of the interrelationship between "real" music and technologically or industrially produced "noise." If, then, as Eshun argues, the "real" is ideology in its worst sense and "alienation" is more normative than strictly pathological, does this mean that "faked" music can be both aesthetically and morally "good"?
As a musician, it is this last question in which I am most interested. This is perhaps why, at some points, this essay might sound somewhat like a manifesto of sorts: part of my motivation for thinking about these issues is to develop, as a philosopher, the theoretical context for my work as a musician. However, since I care about these issues because they are linked to significant political and philosophical problems, the relevance of this study extends much beyond my own work.
Kofman: Fetishism-Recognition and Disavowal
Kofman begins her essay "Baubô: Theological Perversion and Fetishism" (1998) with an investigation of Nietzsche's use of this last term, "fetishism."
The main way in which Nietzsche uses "fetishism" is to describe the "reactive" perspective of those who deny the nonuniversality of their view-the perverse "priestly" viewpoint that inverts the active affirmation of life into a negation. According to Kofman, "Nietzsche uses the term fetishist to describe a primitive psychology found at the origins of language, reason, and metaphysics" (1998, 21) . Western language, reason, and metaphysics have become fetishistic insofar as they disavow the "illusion" or "lie" that stands at their foundation. What is fetishized is the "truth": its genesis in error and in instinct are disavowed. Describing Nietzsche's discussion of the "wishing not to see something that ones does see; wishing not to see something as one does not see it" as a concomitant "recognition" and "disavowal," Kofman brings Nietzsche's conception of fetishism in line with psychoanalytic (particularly Freudian) ones 3 (Kofman 1998, 22) .
In Freudian psychoanalysis, fetishism is generally viewed as a perversion or abnormality; Kofman elides Nietzsche's concept of fetishism with his much more commonly found notion of "perversion." In Kofman's analysis, Nietzsche's sense of "perversion" indicates a particular content ("x" specific idea is perverse) and a form (perversion occurs through an inversion or reaction, and this inversion is not a flaw in, but the very foundation of, the system in question). The refusal to acknowledge that contemporary European systems of value are inversions of life-affirming values, the disavowal of "truth's" genesis in error-these are the ideas that are perverse.
Put diff erently, the content of this fetishism-that which is fetishized-is "truth" itself: instead of acknowledging that "truth" arose from error (or, that no one has the Phallus) and that all "truth" is perspectival, Truth is posited as necessary, absolute, and universal. "That which is perverse," Kofman explains, ". . . is the will to impose one's own nature on another . . . to designate as 'supernatural' the fictitious would and not to will to recognize its natural, too natural character. It is, in short, the refusal to acknowledge perspective as such" (1998, 25) . What is disavowed, in Kofman's reading, is the social and contingent character of knowledge; this fetishism is in turn perverse, because it is not just any lie, but a particularly and perniciously dishonest one. A "counterfeiting that sanctifies," this disavowal takes place not so much via a negation or denial as via an overstatement: the limited status of one's perspective is disavowed, and thus the validity, importance, or "truth" of this perspective is considered to be greater than it, in fact, is (Kofman 1998, 25) . Or, put diff erently, "a counterfeit is a perverse invention of a fictional metaphysical realm; its goal is to pass off the 'real' world as a world of 'appearances'" (27). This artificial realm passes not only as the "real" world, but the most, ultimately, and transcendentally "real" world.
The diff erence, then, between the baseline disavowal necessary for the consolidation of concepts and the perverse disavowal characteristic of Western metaphysics is this "sanctification"-that is, the second layer of disavowal wherein the initial misrecognition is not only denied, but absolutized.
If the content of this perversion is, loosely, ressentiment or a reactive worldview, then its form or structure is to be the normative assumption grounding epistemic and ethical judgments. In Kofman's analysis, "perversion" does not mean a cognitive, psychic, or moral flaw in an otherwise "healthy" system, which can thus be "remedied" by education or therapy; rather, it is a foundational "dishonest lie" that gives consistency and meaning to the system itself. She argues that "fetishism should not be considered as an error necessary and particular to certain periods of human development and thus destined to disappear over time, but corresponds instead to a refusal to see" (1998, 22) . Accordingly, this "perversion" is not an unfortunate mistake that will clear itself up; rather, it is foundational to present systems of thought and value-it is not an abnormality, but is itself the norm in European society. Depending on whose reading of Freud you follow, Nietzsche's formal claim about perversion/fetishism makes him either similar or dissimilar to Freud. 4 The important thing here is that Kofman, Nietzsche, and perhaps Freud (again, depending on how you read him) claim that fetishism is not an abnormality, but is indeed the norm-insofar as we engage Western culture (call it "European values" or "civilization"), we are all perverse, all engaged in fetishism.
It would appear that Nietzsche advocates a simple correction, for he maintains the hierarchical language of "top" and "bottom" without deconstructing this binary pair. However, as Kofman notes, "even if Nietzsche keeps the old metaphor and the privilege of 'top' over the 'bottom'," he revaluates and thereby deconstructs this hierarchy: if "the so-called absolute world 'above' us is only the result of an evaluation from a lower perspective, one which goes from the bottom to the top," then any perspective that continues to view them hierarchically is, in fact, a fetishistic disavowal of their common origin (1998, 31). As Kofman explains, "to borrow the language of morality: since all evaluations are instinctive, they all have a 'low' origin"; in the language of aesthetics, they "refuse to admit a common origin for the base and the sublime" (1998, 31-32). Accordingly, Kofman claims that Nietzsche retains spatial metaphors in order to deconstruct the way they are mobilized hierarchically in contemporary moral and aesthetic judgments. Thus, in analyzing Nietzsche's notion of fetishism (with its own spatial language) alongside his deconstruction of spatial metaphors in general, Kofman presents us with a Nietzschean deconstruction of fetishism. In Kofman's account, Nietzsche claims that the world is presently upended, fictions are posited as Truths, and European values are lifenegating; however, as there is, in his account, no "natural" or "normative" orientation to return to, Kofman claims that Nietzsche's use of these terms is an instance of their deconstruction. Since "many passages in Nietzsche denounce the idea of a nature in itself, as they do that of a finality, indeed the whole idea of nature . . . 'nature' (as well as denaturation and thus also perversion) needs to be revalued, read as if crossed-out" (1998, 25) .
Invoking the notion of reading a concept "under erasure," Kofman implies that the diff erence between "natural" and "artificial," "real" and "fake,"
is to be thought in terms of différance. That is to say, Nietzsche is not so much trying to collapse the two terms ("right" and "perverse," "real" and "fake") into one another, to show their indiff erence, but to critique their supposed opposition and argue for their interrelatedness. Here Kofman seems to be expanding on Derrida's brief discussion of Nietzsche in the essay "Différance." Characterizing Nietzsche's thought as "a critique of philosophy as active indiff erence to diff erence," Derrida claims that Nietzsche reworks binary pairs such as truth/fiction or nature/culture "not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other diff erent and deferred in the economy of the same" (1982, 17) . To argue for the sameness-or better, the identity-of apparently opposed terms does not in fact escape or critique binary logic, for such an analysis maintains an either/or structure: rather than opposed, these two terms are instead the same. What différance allows for, and what Derrida finds in Nietzsche, is the drawing of "binary opposites" into relations of nonoppositional otherness: for example, although there is significant interplay between "nature" and "culture," they nonetheless maintain an irreducible diff erence ("culture as nature diff erent and deferred, diff ering-deferring" [1982, 17] ). Following this model of deconstruction, Kofman explains that "the abstract, 'denatured,' 'antinatural' world is still a 'natural' world: it too is the expression of a certain form of life. In this sense, all 'culture' is natural," but only insofar as the relationship between these two concepts is not one of identity but of mutual constitution (1998, 25) . Or, as Slavoj Žižek explains, if the aim of deconstruction "is to demonstrate that the 'condition of impossibility' of a philosophical system (i.e., what, within the horizon of this system, appears as the hindrance to be surmounted, the secondary moment to be subdued) actually functions as its inherent condition of possibility" (1993, 3) , then Nietzsche's point here is precisely as Kofman describes it-that both the bifurcation and the conflation of the pair "nature" and "culture" or "normal" and "perverse" are invalid. The interdependence of these terms requires their separateness; this separateness, in turn, cannot be absolute, for this would preclude interdependence. Accordingly, it would be false to claim that one is inherently and necessarily the perversion of the other (culture is the corruption of nature, nature as a reversion from or immature form of civilization-both being claims that have variously been used to justify political and aesthetic hierarchies).
In other words, to deconstruct nature/culture or real/artifice binaries in Kofman's and Nietzsche's sense involves recognizing both the denotative and the normative consequences of thinking such terms as "perversion" and "nature" "under erasure." Denotatively, one term is irreducible to the other (indeed, isn't fetishism precisely the claim that one phenomenon is identical to/exchangeable for a diff erent one?). This is true precisely because they give each other meaning and function-"nature" and "culture" or "normal" and "perverse" simply are not interchangeable. Normatively, this typographic metaphor ("under erasure") indicates that attempts to place the two terms in a hierarchical relationship incorrectly assume their mutual exclusivity. For example, if every "truth" arises from necessary misperceptions and "stylizations," then anything viewed as "proper" gains its coherency and comprehensibility as such only because of some logically and/or chronologically prior "perversion" of "reality." Thus, to claim that the "normal" is inherently and necessarily better than the "perverse" (or that the "perverse" is better than the "normal") is to perform the very "fetishism" for which Nietzsche condemns the European will-to-truth-that is, the disavowal of their mutual origin and non-oppositional character.
Nietzsche's and Kofman's claim here is that every aspect of human life is, in some way, "artificial"; hence, what is in fact perverse-a genuine disavowal of everyday empirical experience-is to deny the artificial or manufactured aspect of every perception, datum, claim, and proposition.
For example, to view digital pitch correction as a "corruption" of "natural" voice or talent is to overlook, among other things, the basically arbitrary (or, more mildly, socially constructed) nature of the diatonic scale and Western harmony in general, as well as the ways in which various aspects of the recording and/or performance process influence and/or alter the sound of one's voice (e.g., the kind of microphone or recording medium used produces specific "eff ects" on the voice). Or, similarly, to claim that music qua fetishized commodity corrupts/is a corruption of music and/or society itself fetishizes a state of wholeness or purity in order to disavow the extent to which musical practices and social relations/identities are contingent and constructed. In Žižek's terms, Nietzsche's use of perversion indicates the disavowal of the ways in which that which appears as necessarily external to a system rests, in actuality, as or at its very foundation (more on this later).
As Kofman notes, one of the most important aspects of Nietzsche's deconstruction of nature/culture or normal/perverse binaries is that he nevertheless continues to use conceptions of perversion and fetishism in order to make normative claims about European philosophy and culture.
Obviously interested in making (strong) value judgments, Nietzsche maintains the terminology, but accords it diff erent denotative sense and normative function. Denotatively, as previously discussed, Nietzsche uses these terms "under erasure." Normatively, he changes the grounding from and in terms of which value judgments are made: claims about the (up)rightness of any position are not made in reference to some "lost"
ideal, but in terms of their consequences for the present and future. Thus, for Nietzsche, not all kinds of artifice are equally as desirable. "Dreams and art," Kofman explains, "are the doubles of reality: they imply positive relations. Fictions born from ressentiment are inverted and evanescent shadows, able only to deprecate it" (1998, 27) . Artifice is, in itself, neither positive nor negative; however, when it does not contribute to the flourishing of life (when it is not "healthy," as it were), it is perverse. Although she does not express it in these terms, the implication of Kofman's analysis here is that, in Nietzsche's usage, something is perverse not because it deviates from a preestablished norm (of representation, of behavior, etc.), but because of its eff ects on and consequences for human existence. 5 Thus, for Nietzsche, the aesthetic, cultural, and even moral value of art lies not in its fidelity to norms, either "naturalness" or "avant-garde culture," for the privileging of one over the other is a fetishistic disavowal of their conceptual and practical interdependence.
Essential Logic's Deconstructive "Logos"
In explaining how Kofman's reading of Nietzsche's deconstruction is important for music, it is useful to examine a particular instance in which it appears in music-specifically, in the relationship between the "nature"
and "culture" presented in the 1979 single "Music is a Better Noise" by British post-punk band Essential Logic. 6 In this piece, Essential Logic makes the verbal and musical claim that "Music is close, music is a better noise / Than rumbling catapults, than bumbling cranes." In other words, music and noise are not distinct, but "close," and this "noise," which is so intimately connected to "music," is just as artificial and industrially produced as anything put out by EMI, Rough Trade, or Factory. Absent is any reference to either music or noise as "natural," direct expression, uncorrupted by overproduction or the marketplace. Comparing music to the sonic productions of the military-industrial complex while moving from a "noisy" No-Wave-like introduction to a bass-driven disco groove, this song presents the idea that "noise" is not significantly more or less "produced"-or "oppositional"-than disco, the commercialized/alienated "producer's" genre. 7 Thus, there are two levels at which this song's deconstruction takes place: first, the lyrics assess music/noise binaries; second, the musical form of the song questions contemporary value judgments made about specific kinds of music in terms of the music/noise hierarchy.
After an eight-bar saxophone introduction, Laura Logic's vocals begin with the statement, "Life to death, I want to hear those . . . violins." This line is delivered in a deeper and diff erently accented voice than what Logic presents as her own throughout the rest of the song. Indeed, the line expressing a desire to hear, literally, the master of orchestral instruments is presented in a much deeper and huskier voice than the rather wispy, high-pitched, "feminine" voice with which Logic delivers the rest of the song. The gendering of these voices reflects the typical gendering of "serious" and "popular" music. "Serious" or "intellectual" music is masculine, for all the same stereotypical reasons masculinity is associated with thinking, reason, et cetera. On the other hand, "noise" is associated with a feminine position, for the feminine is usually the representative of "nature" as opposed to culture, irrationality as opposed to reason, immaturity as opposed to enlightenment. Alternately, "femininity" can represent not "nature," but commoditization (e.g., Irigaray's argument that women are commodities, and that the commodity in general is "feminized" [1985] ), insofar as the latter represents weakness (giving in, "selling out") as well as immaturity of taste (music for the "unwashed masses," i.e., teenage girls). Since it has been associated with both "nature" and "alienation," femininity clearly has no necessary or essential meaning or relation to a particular kind of music or style of musical practice. Its function here is evaluative: the cultural devaluation of certain musical properties and practices is reinforced by their association with culturally devalued features and behavior expressed in terms of gender. As seen here, even before examining the content of her lyrics, Logic's method of delivery indicates that there exists no necessarily valid normative weight to music/noise hierarchies. Because "femininity" can be (and has been) associated with either "music" or "noise," depending on which is considered less "serious" or "avant-garde" in a particular instance, the terms of this hierarchy are at least reversible, if not somewhat interchangeable. The status of "noise" and its relation to "music" is paradoxical and slippery not only in its gendering-noise can be both musical and unmusical; it can be valued for its "unmusicality" or devalued for its "unmusicality"; it can be valued for its "musicality" or devalued for its "musicality"; it is "natural" and thus feminized, or it is "difficult" and "tough," thus masculinized; it is primal and embodied, thus "colored"; it is the staticky drone of technology, thus "white." Sometimes, "noise" stands as the raw, primitive, primal scene we look to as a remedy for "music's" civilized, disciplined, overly produced complexity. Consider the reverence for Robert Johnson, Jack White, Wilco, and even the Ramones. Sometimes, however, "noise" stands as the unrefined amusicality of the not-evenamateur. Take, for example, William Hung (who, for the record, is usually pitch-perfect, yet is clearly not "musical" in his interpretations of the top 40). 8 Sometimes "noise" connotes "naturalness" (which can be either good or bad); sometimes it connotes "fakery" and overdependence on technology (this, too, can be either good or bad). What seems consistent about the relationship between music and noise is not the content of the categories, but their hierarchical, evaluative function-their différance, as it were.
After this expository material, the main argument of the song is presented: "Music is close, music is a better . . . noise / Than the rumbling catapults, than bumbling cranes." As she enunciates "catapults," Logic makes a catapult-like noise with her voice, which is sometimes accompanied by a guitar string plucked in the manner of a slingshot; when she says "cranes" ("cray-ya-nes"), her voice dips and rises, evocative of a wrecking ball swinging (dipping and rising) from a crane. Because these noises are musically (re)presented, this suggests that these "noises" are only arbitrarily separated out from "music." Music is close to noise, but somehow a hierarchy has been constructed-music is a better noise, for some reason or other. Indeed, when Karlheintz Stockhausen scores for a quartet of helicopters, it is considered not only "art" music, One could argue that music is systematically organized sound, whereas these noises are random, but that claim ignores the fact that the shooting of a slingshot and the operation of a crane are very precisely calculated activities (we hope, at least). However, these latter activities are performed by rough-and-tumble youngsters, or by equally rough but more well-worn construction workers-that is, by children and the working class, not by a well-educated and highly trained performer clad in formalwear. Excepting ageist and classist prejudices, the only distinction between the Beethoven and the Bobcat seems to be that music is organized as sound, while the rumbling and bumbling Logic mentions are the aural byproducts of other activities of which the telos is not acoustic. Even with this qualified position, the following problem remains: Cage's 4'33" deconstructed the boundary between "music" and "acoustic byproducts" of "nonmusical" activity (the rustling of clothes and programs, the hum of the ventilation system, the sound of people walking on the floor above or practicing in the rooms below). If even these "secondary" sounds count as music, is there any way to distinguish between death metal and demolition crews? Einsturzende Neubauten indeed.
In addition to and alongside the argument made by the lyrics and their delivery, the musical form of the piece draws together-points out the "closeness"-of two disparate styles: avant-garde "noise" music and "noisy," "un-musical" disco grooves; or, the "noise" of "rumbling catapults and grumbling cranes" and the "music" of disco. Over the course of the song, these two styles are elaborated in areas that are increasingly less distinct and/or separate. In the end, the "noise" vocal line is sung over a rather funky disco bass, eff ecting, if not a blending of the two seemingly opposed styles, a transition between them. Taking the time signature as 2/x, the formal breakdown looks something like this:
After a stop-start sax introduction, A is somewhat of a first "verse," B like a chorus (indeed, presenting the main lyrical argument about music being close to noise and musically a development of the introductory material), and A1 is somewhat of an altered or formally augmented second "verse"
(there is an extra measure at the end of the second stanza). Note the opposition of violins in A to cranes and catapults as the instruments of choice in A1, alongside the symmetrical form in A and the asymmetrical form in A1. In A2, the rumbling catapults and bumbling cranes-the vocal line from very early in the song-are presented as industrial instruments not of construction and development, but of the music industry (from violins to industrial noise to disco bass). On the one hand, these "extramusical" noises are integrated into very melodic disco; on the other, these "avantgarde" or "arty" sounds are integrated with stereotypically commercial music (the implication being that commercial music isn't "real" music).
The transformation of A from the smooth, symmetrical, almost "classical"
form and content, to the "noisy" avant-garde form and content of A1, to the funky, danceable, musical noise of A3 traces both the history of reversals of noise/music hierarchies, and also, in A3, poses their deconstruction.
Similar to the way in which sonata-allegro form confirms the primacy of the tonic by rearticulating, in the recapitulation, the secondary theme in the primary key, A2 and A3 present variations on the thematic material of A above a disco rhythm section. Unlike sonata-allegro form, this piece does not, in the end, exclude one of the two terms, nor does it create a hierarchy between them, nor does it reduce or conflate them into one. Rather, it presents them in an abiding "closeness": so "close," in fact, that which side represents "noise" and which side represents "music" can be determined only in view of a specific context.
This "closeness" is precisely Kofman's point-that is, that the relationship of the "natural" and the "cultural," the "musical" and the "noisy" is more osmotic than dichotomous or identical. Thus, when people like Bob Dylan say that recording technology is killing music, 9 or when rockists like Jack White fetishize 40-year-old 4-track machines, what is really going on is fetishistic perversion in both a strict Freudian and Nietzschean sense.
Their claim that techno-industrial "noise" (in general, not specifically the genre[s] of music; indeed, what these men might qualify as "noise" is probably more conventionally "musical" than the typical Sisters of Mercy album) is the condition of the impossibility of "music" disavows the fact that the careers of both men have largely rested on the mass distribution of recorded music. 10 Indeed, both of these artists prefer specific recording technologies and devices over others because they produce a certain, preferable "sound." Further, these artists and the genres in which they practice (e.g., blues, folk, indie rock) do not put a premium on conventional vocal training. Thus, to argue that the use of tools such as digital pitch correction, Garageband, or ProTools is aesthetically and morally bad because it intervenes in a relatively "pure" or "immediate" process (either of expression or of labor) disavows the extent to which all contemporary popular music (indeed, recorded music in general) is industrially-produced "noise."
As officially sanctioned reality is divergent from actual reality. So here, it could be said, one has an agreement to misinterpret the world. One has to learn to see the world wrongly, but with the assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions will be validated by white epistemic authority. (Mills 1997, 18) The racial contract, as Mills describes it, functions to situate nonwhites as nonhuman, which is clearly invalid at the empirical, physiological, cognitive, and moral levels. However, what functions as the "truth" of race or the "reality" of the world is, given the epistemic norms of the racial contract, a disavowal of the actual empirical facts and logically valid claims that can be made about humans and our world. Since the racial contract is necessary only because nonwhites are, in fact, human, and race is not a "natural kind" that any objective observer could find with careful observation, there is, in this sense, a "recognition" at work that is then all the more emphatically disavowed. In this light, then, the racial parents, or because the association with "powerful" black male sexuality eases discomfort about the supposedly "feminizing" or "queering" aspects of musical performance, for example). 11 In brief, music made, for example, by
Delta bluesmen was thought to be more "real" or "musical" than that made by the "alienated" white bourgeois culture industry, because (among other reasons) these men were believed to be more "real" (that is, more masculine; more in touch with their bodies and with the "real" world of suff ering, work, and hardship; more "true," because they supposedly weren't commercially and moral "lack" found in technologically-produced "fake" music rests on and reinforces/confirms this "contract to misrecognition." As in Freudian negation, where the denial of something indicates instead an affirmation of it, the assertion of the "realness" of both these kinds of music and these kinds of masculinity affirms instead their "fakeness"-their status as "consensual hallucination" or "virtual reality" (Mills 1997, 18-19) .
In other words, this notion of "realness" relies on a racialized and gendered conceptualization of immediacy and alienation. While the "real" is clearly a mythical construct, it is essential to refrain from conflating the categories of real and fake, for, as in Nietzsche's analysis, there are denotative and normative advantages to maintaining their différance. The denotative advantages are always the same (greater empirical accuracy), but the normative ones are context-specific-in this case, the specific political context of the aesthetic claims made about "fake" music. Normatively, this real/fake distinction functions to articulate and reinforce racial and gender privilege; accordingly, it is imperative that the diff erential functioning of these claims is subject to critique. This is possible only if the two terms are kept, to a certain extent, separate, because their function, while related, is precisely to assert and justify group diff erence.
Politics
It is my contention that the "classic 60s myth of the blues and the Rolling Stones, the entire rock heritage which starts out with this famous myth of Muddy Waters and the Rolling Stones" is what underlies-at least in partmuch anxiety about the use of technology to "fake it" in contemporary popular music (Eshun 1998, A[178] ). Stereotypes about the "natural virility"
of economically underprivileged African American men serve to ground the aesthetic and moral value of "raw" or "real" music. What is at issue
here is not only (or even) primarily musical values, but also gender and race anxiety-if anything because these musical values gain part of their sense, coherence, and justification from their alignment with and reinforcement/ reconsolidation of already-existing systems of gender and race privilege.
Thus, it might perhaps be better to say that this concern with "faking it" in music arises because it taps into gender anxiety in its intersection with race.
The Pet Shop Boys' Neil Tennant touches on these gendered musical values:
"it's kinda macho nowadays to prove you can cut it live" (Frith 2000, 268) .
If strength and virility are found in demonstrations of relative virtuosity (either in the sense of the speed-metal guitarist or in the sense of no-wave cacophony), then the use of technology (e.g., pitch correction, backing tracks, lip synching) is criticized because it implies "weakness"-that is, a failure of masculinity.
The use of technology to either (1) mask unmusical "noise" such as wrong notes or the clatter of a dropped mute, or (2) produce slick, commercially (and thus not, according to the stereotype, musically!) oriented tracks serves as the supposed condition of impossibility of "real" music, for in the "classic 60s myth," music is an avenue through which alienated white bourgeois culture looks to its stereotypes about economically underprivileged African American men, viewing these men as a "natural resource"
in and through which white culture "refreshes" or "rejuvenates" itself.
Furthermore, the mimesis of men whose sexuality and virility is supposedly unquestionable quells anxieties about the contingent or "alienated" status of one's own masculine identity-or better yet, it conceals precisely the unnaturalness and contingency of white masculine identity. Insistence on "reality" disavows the constructedness and contingency of each category-that each "truth" rests on a foundational "error" (i.e., false generalization or stereotype)-in Mills's terms, this "foundational error" would be the racial contract to misrecognition, which constructs both white and nonwhite subjects/nonsubjects.
When Eshun makes the argument that "the 'street' is considered the ground and guarantee of all reality, a compulsory logic explaining all Black
Music," his version of the "classic 60s myth" functions precisely as a contract to misrecognition, "conveniently mishearing antisocial surrealism as social realism" (1998, -004). 12 However, while white rock calls upon the "contract of misrecognition" in an attempt to return to some sort of unalienated, unfeminized past ("Robert Johnson") and to avoid the "perversion" of "genuine" artistry by machines, some Afro-futurist hip-hop takes alienation as its starting point and seeks to increase it exponentially.
Like Nietzsche's "healthy" art, art as "honest" lie, Eshun's Afro-futurist hiphop takes the "virtual reality" or "consensual hallucination" as its explicit foundation, "thereby accentuating its unreality principle" (1998, -004). I argue that Eshun's analysis of Afro-futurist hip-hop is akin to the deconstructive work done by Kofman and Essential Logic. His theory of "motion capture" rethinks body/technology dichotomies in a more empirically accurate and normatively appropriate fashion. Paying specific attention to racialized notions of the "alien" in "alienation," Eshun takes Nietzsche's, Kofman's, and Essential Logic's deconstructive claims about the fetishization of "real" music and puts them explicitly in the context of their race and gender politics. Thus, Eshun's critique of "postwar alienation" as an aspect of the "classic 60s myth" helps to reveal the normative/political issues at stake in contemporary judgments about the relative value of technologically "faked" music. 
Race, Gender, and the Contract to Misrecognition
In More Brilliant Than The Sun, Eshun makes the argument that "absolute music" (the idea that "Good music speaks for itself. No Sleevenotes required" [00(-007)] has, in an almost Hegelian fashion, reappeared in contemporary pop music culture as the double-negation of its nineteenthcentury incarnation. It still denotes "real" or "authentic" music free of the limitations of "extramusical" content; however, this time around the "extramusical" content means things like concern for performer appearance, postproduction (e.g., digital pitch correction), videos, commercial appeal, and the like. Since the 1960s, pop music has presented itself as the "real" music of "real" people-the antithesis to the abstract overintellectualization and inaccessibility of Western art music ("absolute music" qua thesis). In attempting to negate the values of Western art music, contemporary pop music culture ends up positing the same idealthis idea of "music in itself" or the "purely musical," as its own. This time around, the "purely musical" is not to be found in the metaphysical ether, but in the ineff ability of the body and the "street." 14 Thus, argues Eshun, contemporary music criticism is filled with "homilies . . . masquerading as vectors into the Trad Sublime" (00[-007]). Whether it is Biggie Smalls or Brahms one is extolling, either for "keepin' it real" or for evoking transcendent Ideas, the logic/logos remains the same.
Although he does not explicitly demonstrate the gender politics of the "Trad Sublime," nor its relation to the gender and race politics of the "classic 60s myth," Eshun implies their relationship, especially in his distinction between "real" people and, by implication, subpeople, which is a hierarchy historically fraught with gendered and raced overtones. Mills's racial contract to misrecognition requires, at its foundation, the hierarchical diff erentiation between "real" persons and "fake" or "sub-persons"; similarly, Eshun's analysis of the various versions of the "classic 60s myth"
demonstrates that its "ethical standard for sound, refined into proper
[music] for true people" implicitly relies on this same real/fake distinction (1998, 02[022] ). In this nouveau myth, a "real" person is one who is, paradoxically, denied access to the "reality" that, when one encounters it, produces the feeling of the determinately negated "Trad Sublime" (i.e., the "street," the Delta Blues).
From Eshun's analysis, we see that it is because whites are real "people"
("citizens" in the Hegelian sense of abstract, quality-less individuals, voids of subjectivity in the Lacanian/Žižekian sense), and that they are alienated from the "real." In corresponding fashion, because subpeople (women, racial minorities, queers, et cetera) are not full "citizens," not real "people,"
they appear for that fact more "real," less "alienated," closer to nature and less mediated in their embodiment. The slippage here between "real" and "alienated" is similar to the slippage between "music" and "noise" discussed earlier in this essay. Just as the content of the categories "music" and "noise" are dependent upon context (e.g., is commercial disco supposedly "bad"
because it is too melodic and "musical," or does that same melodic catchiness make it a commodity, thus unmusical "noise"?), who counts as "real"
and who counts as "alienated" also depends upon context (are we talking about being a "real person" or "keepin' it real"?). In regards to both sets of terms, the paired items give one another their sense through the working of différance in a specific context, on a particular terrain. Deconstructing thusly the axis around which the "classic 60s myth" (as a version of the contract to Although stereotypically associated with femininity, "naturalness" and "immediacy" could be appropriated by males without a concordant loss in masculinity, provided they exhibited the proper "strength" or "virility" to overcome the potentially disempowering (that is, nonrational) eff ects of these attributes. Thus it was, according to Battersby, that the genius "walked a 'sublime' path between sanity and madness, between the monstrous and the superhuman" (1989, 103). The path of the genius was "sublime" because he encountered, struggled with, and ultimately overcame the subhuman or "monstrous" world; indeed, it is by virtue of his whiteness, (mostly heterosexual) masculinity, and economic privilege that he, unlike those other subhuman groups (women, queers, racial minorities, and the working-class), can "successfully" negotiate these perceived threats. Here we see that the "classic 60s myth," in which white bourgeois men recoup for themselves the qualities stereotypically associated with African American masculinity, is but one version of the "Trad Sublime." This is true insofar as the latter indicates the appropriation by privileged ("human") groups as advantageous characteristics which, when found in marginalized (subhuman) groups, are viewed as disadvantageous. 15 In the Trad Sublime, the "classic 60s myth," and their contemporary variations, the logic remains the same: privileged groups, because they have greater access to "technology," view themselves/are viewed as "alienated."
One proposed remedy is to adopt the cultural practices and behaviors of underprivileged groups that are stereotypically viewed as less alienated.
"Nature" and "immediacy" become premium cultural commodities-but only when exhibited by members of privileged groups. When found in members of underprivileged groups, qualities such as these-e.g., embodiment, emotiveness, sensuality-are precisely those criteria by which underprivileged individuals are considered deficient in their humanness.
This situation seems irrevocably (perhaps "eternally"?) ironic, in the same way that kitsch is, by necessity, ironic in operation: naturalness and immediacy are luxuries in some instances, and evidence of inferiority in others. 16 The other side of this irony is that technology, when employed by privileged groups, is viewed as disempowering, alienating (when in fact it is part and parcel of their maintained privilege/dominance).
What is consistent throughout these flips, switches, and inversions is the continued insistence upon the opposition of technology and the body, between industrial production and artistic expression. In critiquing the "classic 60s myth" and the various forms of its binarization of the body and technology, Eshun is not so much interested in replacing the "myth" and Like Kofman's Nietzsche, Eshun realizes the nonoppositional yet nonidentical relationship between "myth" and "reality" and, consequently, the way in which attempting to eliminate "misrecognition" altogether continues to buy into the same real/fake hierarchies that ground the "classic 60s" version of the contract to misrecognition. 17 The positive side to his project, then, involves the analysis and perpetuation of "healthy" myths, empowering Sonic Fictions that contribute to human flourishing, which contrast to the "perverse" racist myths of the "Trad Sublime." "Motion capture" is one such empowering myth.
Motion Capture: Hyperembodiment via the Wheels of Steel
Recontextualizing the animation/animatronic process of motion capture, Eshun uses this concept to describe a theory of the relationship between music, the body, and technology that does not disavow their différance, as it were. Rather than grounding both identity and aesthetic value in racist, (hetero)sexist, and classist stereotypes that view technology as alienating and disempowering, Eshun's theory of motion capture explores the ways in which the use of technology is constructive and empowering, both in aesthetics and identity politics.
Although "motion capture sounds like a mechanical operation being conducted," it is not, for that fact, opposed to or exclusive of embodiment;
even though it might be industrial (digital or mechanical), it is not, for that fact, any more or less properly "human" (Eshun 1998, A[180] ). For Eshun, motion capture occurs in music in the form of "breakbeat science," or, in more common parlance, sampling. This is particularly significant, given early criticisms of turntablism that claimed it wasn't "musical practice," both because a turntable wasn't a "real" musical instrument, and because the DJ was supposedly just playing other people's music, not his or her own (US Copyright Law is still stuck in this misperception of sampling, as evidenced by Danger Mouse's recent off ering, The Grey Album). So at first, some considered sampling and turntablism "unmusical noise." Indeed, the choice of the term "science" to describe musical practice is meant to challenge the idea that science is methodological, cold, unemotional, and disembodied, a practice that "drains the blood of life and leaves everything vivisected" (Eshun 1998, A[177] ), while music is a font of personal expression on either the emotional or physical front. Early hip-hop is, for Eshun, evidence that this opposition is false, that "in music it's never been like that; as soon as you hear the word science, you know you're in for an intensification of sensation. In this way, science then refers to a science of sensory engineering" (1998, A[177]). Science is not the condition of impossibility of music or musical "expression"; music can seem immediate because of a high degree of acoustical engineering, instrument engineering, and music theory. 18 "Human" expression requires a whole lot of "science"
to construct it as such and to invest it with meaning: "sound machines" don't alienate you-they "throw you onto the shores of the skin you're in" (Eshun 1998, -001). As various psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, and phenomenological accounts of subjectivity demonstrate, access to emotions and embodied experience is never immediate, requiring conceptual, social, and material apparatuses (e.g., the mirror in Lacan's mirror stage) as instruments in the "technology of the self." To continue with the Lacanian example, the infant needs the mirror, its mother, and language (at minimum!) to be aware that it's even "in" a "skin." Indeed, Kristeva's theory of abjection argues that even the awareness of the diff erence between "inside"
and "outside" requires some work, let alone that the "skin" (body) is his or her "own." "Machines," then, "don't distance you from your emotions-in fact quite the opposite. Sound machines make you feel more intensely, along a broader band of emotional spectra than ever before in the 20th century" (Eshun 1998, -002) . In Eshun's analysis, all musical machines function as amplifiers, increasing and augmenting one's physical, emotional, and intellectual responses to music. This "amplification" is most properly compared to the amplification that occurs in the production and playing of feedback, for Eshun's motion capture does not just re-present some preexistant phenomenon so much as it synthesizes something that did not previously exist as such. 19 What motion capture achieves is not merely embodied sensation, but "hyperembodiment, via the Technics SL 1200" (Eshun 1998 , -002)-that is, the wheels of steel. (that is, the vinyl, the track) was not realized in terms of the science of audio engineering. Indeed, multitrack recording greatly facilitates sampling, for it allows a DJ to separate vocals from instrumentals, as well as diff erent instruments from one another. Just as Kofman argues that, for Nietzsche, even the perverse position of European morality is itself the "product of a certain nature" and that it is thus impossible to oppose the natural with the perverse, Eshun's theory of motion capture acknowledges the impossibility of a strict natural/virtual opposition by virtue of the fact that this "virtual"
capturing of the beat is, to a certain extent, a product of the funk engine, the "product of a certain 'nature.'" 20 Or, in Eshun's words, "electronics doesn't decant tribes from tradition into the present, because Trad sonic technologies are already futuristic" (1998, 01[005] ).
Because breakbeat science delves into records and subjects their elements to developing variations, it also requires a mutation or transformation in our listening habits and overall experience of the music. These new sounds and sound technologies create aural "sensations so new there isn't yet a language for them" (Eshun 1998 Multiple personality is no syndrome or disorder but a relaxation, a giving into rather than a fighting against the brain as a society of the mind" (1998,
03[026]
). In this context, alienation does not separate or distance or remove you from your "ownness" or your body (as white culture says it does, and thus requires black culture to "reinvest" itself ); it in fact causes you to experience your body newly, in a kinaesthetic way. Alienation is the "process of landing on the planet of your body made newly audible by rhythmic transvaluation" (Eshun 1998, 02[021] ). It is, in fact, empowering-creating new experiences and forms of/avenues for subjectivity. In light of this "alien" path to agency, "the traditional diagnosis of alienation no longer makes any sense" (Eshun mirror stage: rather than being the scene of your subjectivity via unification (albeit imperfect), it is the scene of your subjectivity via alienation. It's like taking Lacan's theory of the foundation of subjectivity in lack to its most extreme application-its ad absurdiam, as it were. "Instead of synchronizing the mediated body with self image until the 2 make a single knowledge of the self," as in Lacan's mirror stage, hip-hop "disaligns the selves and then continues to multiply them in a mitosis of the I" (Eshun 1998, 03[037] ).
Agency is found not in the unification of the subject, but in one's multipleconsciousness. In Eshun's theorization of hip-hop agency, alienation and technology are not necessarily disempowering; that they tend to be viewed as such is the product of the perverse (in the Nietzschean sense) contract to misrecognition operative in the "classic 60s myth," which continues to structure much of our thinking about musical and ethico-political value. 21 Here, then, "classic 60s myths" of postwar alienation are abandoned. Black conditions are not "misrecognized" as necessarily disempowering, nor as a "natural reserve" to be exploited by white culture, nor as pathological states rehabilitated by (and rehabilitative to) privileged white groups that would colonize/co-opt them.
So What?
So what does all this mean in the context of my initial questions about the aesthetic and ethical status of "faking it"?
The "real" and the "fake" exist in a relationship of différance: the "real" is itself a construct or myth, just as "faking it" requires a lot of real skill and ingenuity, or a good cheater needs lots of practice and experience. But is the kind of "faking it" I'm talking about-such as the use of digital pitch correction-just another form of cheating? This is where Kofman's analysis of "perversion" becomes helpful. To bound and delimit the "real" requires a bit of cheating, or rather, "misrecognition." In order to consolidate the "real" into an identifiable set of qualities or characteristics, some degree of the internal heterogeneity of the phenomenon needs to be overlooked or framed out of the picture, so to speak. When this "artifice" of framing is disavowed, the "real" is perversely fetishized in the same fashion and for the same reason that, in Kofman's reading of Nietzsche, "truth" functions as a "counterfeiting that sanctifies" (Kofman 1998, 25) . Such counterfeiting is possible, as Kofman argues, because there exists a general milieu of, or consensus concerning, "the refusal to acknowledge perspective as such" (25).
Just as in the racial contract to misrecognition, wherein the nonuniversality of Whiteness is disavowed, this fetishization of the "real" mistakes what is stereotypically held to be the experience of a specific group of individuals (e.g., Delta Bluesmen, urban gangstas) for their actual, real-world situation.
In this case-the case of the "classic 60s myth"-the fetishism at work "corresponds . . . to a refusal to see" the construction, by white culture, of the "realness" of working-class African American men (Kofman 1998, 22) .
"Faking it" is "cheating" if musical values are structured in terms of the heterosexist, racist contract to misrecognition, as those found in the "classic 60s myth" or in the stories about "postwar alienation." That is to say, the use of technology to "fake it" can be viewed as morally and/or aesthetically bad only if one holds certain assumptions about the nature and functioning of agency-that is, that agency involves acting "independently," that creativity involves absolute originality of expression, or that good art and good individuals rebel against "industry" (be it the music industry or the militaryindustrial complex). What this view of agency fails to take into account is that this notion of agency qua autonomy is itself a fiction: no one-at least no one in the contemporary United States-escapes postindustrial corporate capitalism (perhaps the most current version of the more mid-twentiethcentury "military industrial complex"). In the era of the banality of evil, the "noncollaborator" or the "rebel" is itself a perverse misrecognition, yet it would be denotatively and normatively problematic to maintain that no one presently exercises agency. This is Eshun's point in revaluing alienation and the eff ects of the "wheels of steel" (industrially-produced instruments of mass culture) on musical quality and aesthetico-political agency. Fantasies of autonomy that would devalue technological "fakery" are disempowering constructs that disavow the actual creative and political agency at work in breakbeat science. Put diff erently, Eshun's claim is that African Americans have always, in the United States, been "aliens" in and "alienated" by white privilege; any agency they exercise comes in spite/in terms of this experience, which the "classic 60s myth" views as disempowering.
Accordingly, in Eshun's analysis of Afro-futurist electro, "alienation"
is not viewed as the opposite or lack of agency, but as a sort of background norm in terms of which any agency must arise. Eshun picks up on the tendency within some black science fiction to emphasize "the correlation . . . Men with odd languages, vehicles, cultural practices, and body types (white here, instead of the stereotypical "green") arrive on tremendously huge, complex, and seemingly out-of-this world ships in order to abduct people against their will, perform various forms of discipline on them, and deliver them to foreign lands. 22 Just as multiple-consciousness is normative, alien status is the everyday reality of racially-marginalized individuals (literally, as immigrants, or more metaphorically, as "not-quite-normal," "vaguely The whole systematic logos, wherein industry/technology is opposed to agency, is part and parcel of the "classic 60s" contract to misrecognition, wherein black identity is falsely stereotyped as being "less mediated" than white identity, and is thus symptom of disempowerment when found in blacks but resource for renewed agency when appropriated by white culture.
In other words, the way in which "real" music is opposed to industriallyproduced "noise" is-in light of Eshun's, Essential Logic's, and Kofman's analyses-a fetishistic misrecognition, motivated by gender and race anxieties, of the variety of ways in which aesthetic and political agency function.
One way to think of this disavowal is in terms of the tendency to construct the aesthetic and moral virtue of the artist in terms of qualities that, when found in individuals from privileged groups, are valued, yet, when found in individuals from underprivileged groups, are considered signs of weakness, fault, or flaw. Put diff erently, Mills's racial contract functions, in the context of the "classic 60s myth," to obscure "the common origin for the base and the sublime" (Kofman 1998 , 32)-the "base" here being constructed, "un-natural," alienated, "faked" music, and the "sublime" representing the supposedly "earnest," "genuine" artistic eff ort. The "common origin" that is being obscured is the mutual construction of white-masculinity-quaprivileged identity and black-masculinity-qua-underprivileged identity in terms of "postwar alienation" and "naturalness"-themselves terms that make sense only in terms of their différance. Indeed, precisely what Essential Logic and Eshun contribute to this issue is their various demonstrations that "music" and "industry" are not mutually exclusive, but rather that "technology" or "alienation"-what is held to be the "condition of impossibility" of what is considered here to be "music" (or vice versa)-"actually functions as its inherent condition of possibility" (Žižek 1993, 3) .
That is to say, the notion of "postwar alienation" structures the entire logos of the "classic 60s myth." Moreover, as we see in Eshun's analysis of electro, "alienation" is not pathological, as it is claimed to be. In this context (which, as I have argued, is more likely the norm than the exception), it is, instead, a background condition or stage upon which agency and creativity play out.
So, I want to argue that "faking it" is not unequivocally "bad," in either the aesthetic or moral sense of the term; many of the reasons given to justify its condemnation rely on a perverse fetishization of a racially and sexually problematic notion of the "real." My analysis of Kofman's Nietzsche and the deconstructive work done in Essential Logic's "Music is a Better Noise"
demonstrates the lack of empirical basis for the opposition of "music" and "technology," which grounds the kinds of criticism I am interested in here.
With the help of Charles Mills's notion of the racial contract, Eshun helps elaborate the politics that explicitly and/or latently motivate this series of disavowals and helps to develop a theory of agency and creativity based in a more accurate empirical assessment of the relationship between "music"
and "noise," the "real" and the "fake," "alienation" and "agency." Because "alienation" is a factical given in contemporary postindustrial societies, and because attempts to disavow this are empirically and politically problematic, perhaps there exists an imperative to, in the terms of the "classic 60s myth," fake it.
I notes
